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NOTES
resolution of most of the problems under the Section are so dependent
on the facts in each case, there is every reason to accept the decisions
of the Board unless clearly arbitrary or unsupported by substantial evi-
dence. This should be an important factor when future orders of the
Board under Section 8(b) (4) (A) are reviewed by the courts.
INCREASING LAND ALIENABILITY THROUGH RE-RECORDING
ACTS-THE INDIANA STATUTE
The usefulness of land as a commercial commodity depends upon
the degree of title alienability which can be assured landowners. Impedi-
ments to ease of conveyance, arise largely from the fact that there may
exist in the same parcel of land various interests, both possessory and
non-possessory, present and future. This multiple ownership creates
complexity of land titles and the possibility of conflicting claims, with
resulting deterrents to alienability. The risks, perhaps, are unsubstantial
while the parties originally involved are still alive. However, the passage
of time eliminates witnesses, dims recollections, and destroys useful.
records, rendering the deterrents more serious by aggravating the task
of resolving conflicts. Moreover, interests originally substantial may
themselves become nominal. Yet, if their unimportance cannot readily
be determined, alienability of valid claims will effectually be deterred.
Largely within the last decade eight states have undertaken to
eliminate much of the needless complexity surrounding land titles, and
thus to encourage their free alienability, by enacting legislation requiring
periodic re-recording of interests in land. Indiana's statute, dating from
1947, was the sixth to be enacted. These statutes may descriptively be
termed "re-recording acts," although re-recording is a misnomer since
their compass extends to interests not within the purview of the tradi-
tional recording system. The impact of this legislation on the problem
of title alienability can be extensive and salutary. In order to assess
its full significance, however, it is desirable to examine the limited
effectiveness of orthodox methods previously available to eliminate deter-
rents to alienability, and then to observe the manner in 'which the
re-recording acts supplement these devices.
Several traditional, methods exist by which clouds on title may be
defeated. Three of these-recitals in deeds, affidavits, and curative acts
-correct fbrmalistic defects in land records. Recitals and affidavits are
mainly evidentiary devices to shift the burden of proof to the challenging
party. For example, recitals in a deed that it was signed and sealed
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in the presence of a New York magistrate was prima facie evidence of
delivery in New York;' and of course recitals can establish an estoppel-
by-deed situation.2 Affidavits, while acceptable by attorneys to explain
or verify the contents of a deed, will not make a title marketable where
the attempt is to supply a deficiency in the record title.3 Curative actg
are designed to carry out the intention of parties to an instrument;4
and being retrospective in nature, they are subject to the rule that a vested
right cannot be destroyed by a retrospective act.5
Statutes of Limitations provide the most common means of remov-
ing deterrents to alienability. Examples of their usual operation to bar
claims which form a cloud on title are: an action by an execution-
debtor to recover realty sold by executors or guardians; an action based
upon an inheritance tax lien; an action on a contract to convey land;
an action on a mortgage after the due date of the debt; and an action
on an unrevived judgment. While the avowed purpose of such statutes
is the nullification of stale claims, a corollary is the removal of deterrents
to alienability.
More important are adverse possession statutes, which provide that
no action can be commenced for the recovery of possession of realty
after the lapse of a certain period. In a sense these too are statutes of
limitations. But in addition they provide a method of land title acquisi-
tion, upon a showing of compliance with the requirements of adverse
possession for the statutory period. Necessarily, claims conflicting with
the rights of the adverse possessor are defeated. Use of the terminology
"adverse possession statutes" emphasizes their title acquisition-deterrent
removal nature.
The usual operation of adverse possession statutes is to defeat an
unexercised action of ejectment available against the adverse claimant
for the statutory period. But it is possible that their impact may extend
further. Of course, the interest of one ignorant of the accrual of his
cause of action may be defeated. 6 Moreover, equitable estoppel could
cause the statute to defeat the interest of a remainderman, even though
no right of possession has accrued to him.7 Adverse possession of land,
good against a trustee, also will bar the equitable present and future
interests in the land. And if an estate is transferred in accordanice with
1. New Haven Trust Co. v. Campbell, 81 Conn. 539, 71 A. 788 (1909).
2. German Mutual Insurance Co. of Indianapolis v. Grim, 32 Ind. 249 (1869).
3. McClain v. Roberts, 194 Iowa 1026, 187 N.W. 444 (1922); Beeler v. Sims,
91 Kan. 571, 139 P. 371 (1914) ; Howe v. Coates, 97 Minn. 385, 107, N.W. 397 (1906).
4. Where a notary failed to attach his seal to a deed, a curative act effectively
cured the defect. Maxey v. Wise, 25 Ind. 1 .(1865).
5. Lewis v. Brackanridge, 1 Blackf. 220 (Ind. 1822).
6. Craven v. Craven, 181 Ind. 553, 105 N.E. 41 (1914).
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the terms of the trust, the transferee takes subject to any adverse posses-
sion that has run against the trustee." Adverse possession will riin
against future interests created after the statute has commenced to
run against the grantor.9 If the owner of a possessory estate surrenders
his interest, the holding of an adverse claimant runs against the future
estate from the date of merger.10 Finally, statutes sometimes provide
that adverse possession will commence to run against the future estate
where a power of termination exists and a breach of the operative
condition occurs.1' In all such situations the adverse possession statutes
operate effectually to increase title alienability.
Contraposed are the situations where deterrents to alienability will
be unaffected. All the defenses available against ordinary statutes of
limitations likewise are available against an adverse claimant. 12  More-
over, since a cause of action in ejectment must have been available for
the statutory period, and since such an action is available only to one
who has the right to possession,' 3 adverse possession is inoperative
against future legal interests.' 4 And even though the particular estate
is sold or adverse possession has fully run against it, no adverse holding
will commence against a future interest until the natural termination of
the particular estate causes the future interest to vest in possession.15 The
necessity that an interest vest in possession before adverse possession
statutes can be operative against it applies to contingent as well as vested
remainders; for today, even in Indiana, the careful title examiner will
assume that the classical contingent remainder can take effect as an
7. Ansonia v. Cooper, 66 Conn. 184, 33 At. 905 (1895); Knutson v. Vidders,
126 Iowa 511, 102 N.W. 433 (1905); Bohrer v. Davis, 94 Neb. 367, 143 N.W. 209
(1913). Distinguish this from the situation of estoppel by deed: Dibble v. Lloyd,
73 Ind. App. 320, 127 N.E. 453 (1920).
8. Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U.S. 564 (1879); Waterman Hall v. Waterman, 220
II. 569, 77 N.E. 142 (1906); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 225 (1936).
9. Sutton v. Clark, 59 S.C. 440, 38 S.E. 150 (1900); Hubbard v. Swafford, 209
Mo. 495, 108 S.W. 15 (1908); REsTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 226 (1936).
10. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 222, comment h (1936).
11. ILL. STAT. ANN. § 107.261 (Jones 1936); MIcH. ComP. LAws § 609.3 (1948).
12. For a competent, brief survey of Statutes of Limitations see Note, 21 IND.
L.J. 23 (1945).
13. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1301 (Burns' Repl. 1946).
14. Lewis v. Barnhart, 145 U.S. 56 (1891); Thompson v. McCorkle, 136 Ind.
484, 34 N.E. 813 (1893); Cross v. Janes, 327 IlL 538, 158 N.E. 694 (1927); Lowry
v. Lyle, 226 Mich. 676, 198 N.W. 245 (1924); Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49,
292 N.W. 38 (1940); RESTATEMiENT, PROPERTY § 222, 1 f (1936). Contra: Wood-
stock Iron Co. v. Fullenwider, 87 Ala. 584, 6 So. 197 (1888); Murray v. Quigley,
119 Iowa 6, 92 N.W. 869 (1902); Commercial Bldg. Co. v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143,
112 So. 378 (1927).
15. For example, even though an adverse possessor has successfully ousted the
particular tenant, his possession will not be adverse as to remaindermen until their
interests vest in possession in accordance with the original measurement of the par-
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executory limitation.' 6 Fihally, there is some authority that if a person
simultaneously holds an undivided present interest and an undivided
future interest in the same portion of land, adverse possession will be
inoperative against the future interest. 17 It is thus illustrated that adverse
possession statutes fall far short of a solution to the alienability problem.
Indeed, they are most ineffective against future interests, the source of
much of thq complexity surrounding land titles.
Similarly limited in removing deterrents to alienability is the tra-
ditional recording system. Certainly, the recording acts tend to clear
land titles by protecting bona fide purchasers for value against conflicting
unrecorded interests. However, recordation of all interests in land is not
required. Moreover, purchasers are put on notice of all those which are
recorded, regardless of their antiquity and possible unimportance. This
device then may be seriously ineffective, even within its somewhat limited
sphere of operation.
In the final analysis, alienability is a term synonymous with market-
ability. And in general the latter is a concept formulated by the con-
veyancing customs of attorneys in a particular locality. Probably the
limited extent to which title alienability is enhanced by the traditional
methods would not pose a serious problem to most attorneys, since many
of the deterrents.ordinarily would be dismissed as nominal. But certain
attorneys, known colloquially as flyspeckers, refuse to pass anything less
than what they consider to be a perfect record title. Since no attorney
wishes to pass a title which might thus be rejected when his client desires
to sell, the flyspeckers establish the practical standards of title alien-
ability. This results in many needless demands for quiet title actions,
the final remedy for clearing land titles. As a result, the deficiencies of
the orthodox devices continue to pose serious conveyancing problems.
Capable of dispelling much of the confusion surrounding land titles
and aiding tremendously the struggle for alienability are the recently
ticular estate. Dawson v. Edwards, 189 Ill. 60, 59 N.E. 590 (1901) ; Tilson v. Thompson,
10 Pick. 359, 27 Mass. 365 (1830); Foster v. Marshall. 22 N.H. 491 (1851).
16. Though the majority of states allow a contingent remainder to take effect
as an executory limitation, Indiana still technically follows the rule of Purefoy ,.
Rogers. Aldred v. Sylvester, 184 Ind. 542, 111 N.E. 914 (1916). But a recent Indiana
case held that the related doctrine of merger was no longer in force in Indiana. Rouse
v. Paidrick, 221 Ind. 517, 49 N.E.2d 528 (1943). Since the passage of the 1945
Indiana, Statute Against Perpetuities, the advantage of preserving the Purefoy rule
is nullified since an interest to be valid need no longer vest at the end of a life
in being, but rather at the end of a life in being plus twenty-one years. It seems
very probable that the courts will carry out the spirit of Rouse by renouncing the
rule of Purefoy v. Rogers when faced directly with the executory limitation question.
17. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §222, comment h (1936). But this would seem an
undesirable policy which grants more protection to a man holding severable interests
than would be afforded a fee owner.
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enacted re-recording acts. This legislation is based upon the logical
theory that a requirement of periodic re-recording of interests in land
is a reasonable duty which will be complied with by those whose claims
are substantial. The acts provide generally that interests must be re-
recorded at periodic intervals or be subject to extinguishment in favor
of a purchaser for value from the record owner. The Michigan type
statute begins by defining a marketable title as b.eing one held by a
possessor who has an unbroken record chain of title for forty years;
succeeding sections then terminate all interests in the land based on
records or acts originating more than forty years in the past, if. the inter-
ests have not been re-recorded.' 8  The Indiana act, though not a statute
of limitations, provides that no action shall be commenced, based upon
various events occurring more than 50 years in the past.19 It is further
18. MIcH. ComI'. LAWS §§ 565.101 to 565.109 (1948). The Michigan type act
was adopted by two other states, Nebraska and South Dakota. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 76-288 to 76-298 (Supp. 1949); S.D. Laws, c. 233 (1947). Recently South Dakota
enacted another statute which is, theoretically, to be construed with the prior act.
S.D. Laws, c. 256 (1951). The history of the Michigan act is of special interest in
indicating that the moving force behind the statutes was the flyspeckers who establish
unreasonable standards for land titles. MICHIGAN H.B. 120, 1945, provided that if -any
attorney should recommend a quiet title action, and if the things alleged to be flaws
would be cured by reason of any rule of law (such as laches or estoppel), then the
attorney's opinion and the abstract would be prima facie evidence of barratry. Though
the bill was not passed, it gave a strange impetus to the re-recording act which
shortly followed.
19. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-628 to 2-637 (Bums' Supp. 1951). The statute provides
that "no action affecting the possession or title of real property shall be commenced"
which is based upon,: (1) an unrecorded instrument executed more than fifty years
prior to the commencement of the action, or (2) an instrument recorded more than
fifty years prior to the action, held by a person not in possession himself or
through a tenant, or (3) a transaction, act, event, or omission occurring more than
fifty years prior to the action, or (4) a claim arising out of a failure of a husband
and wife to join in a deed which was recorded more than fifty years prior to the
action; but in no case will an interest be extinguished which is inherent in the
muniments of title of the record title owner, nor will a greater interest be given a
record owner than the muniments of his title purport to convey. If within the fifty
year period there is filed for record a claim against the property and an "action" is
commenced within one year, the re-recorded interest shall.be protected. Section five
provides that one having a good record title for fifty years shall have a marketable
title, and any purchaser for value shall take free of any claim not recorded within
the prior fifty years; but the provisions of the act are inoperative if the land is in
the hostile adverse possession of -ne other than the record owner. The act does not
extend the period of any Statute of Limitations, nor does it affect the acquisition
of title by adverse possession. Neither disability nor "lack of knowledge of any kind
on the part of anyone" shall suspend the running of the fifty year periods. Section
eight provides that the act shall be inoperative against either a lessor or a mortgagee.
Section nine states the purpose of the act to be "to facilitate and simplify land
transactions . . . by allowing persons dealing with the record title owner to rely on
the record title covering a period of not more than fifty years." Section ten contains
an adequate saving clause for claims already ancient when the act was passed.
There has as yet been no judicial interpretation of the statute, the only reference
being a dictum in Fouts v. Largent, 228 Ind. 547, 94 N.E.2d 448 (1950).
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provided that purchasers for value shall take free of all claims required
by the act to be of record, but' which are not so recorded, within 50
years prior to a purchase for value.2 0 And it is then stated that "claims
extinguished shall include any and all interests of any nature, including
statutory rights in lieu of dower or curtesy, reversions, tax deeds, rights
as heirs or under wills, and whether such claims are asserted by a person
for himself or another, whether such a person is natural or corporate,
private or governmental." 2 1
Two exceptions are made to the operation of the Indiana statute:
neither a reversioner of a long term leasehold nor a mortagee is required
to re-record his interest at fifty year intervals. 22 The exceptions are
probably unjustified. The burden of re-recording is slightly greater for
a realty management concern or a lending agency than it would be for
individuals; but the increased duties do not warrant the decrease in
alienability that will result from disagreements as to when a document
constitutes either a mortgage or lease.23 But the practical effects of the
exceptions are mitigated slightly by the fact that an exception to the
act probably exists in favor of the federal government ;24 thus, a complete
abstract search would be necessary even without the exceptions. But
although an incidental result may be to lessen abstracting chores by
permitting a cursory examination and analysis of most ancient claims,
in any event such is not the purpose of the statute.
It should be emphasized that the re-recording acts do not replace,
20. Section 2-636 provides: "This act is intended to effect the legislative purpose
of simplifying and facilitating land transactions by allowing persons dealing with the
record title owner to rely on the record title covering a period of not more than fifty
years prior to the date of such dealing."
Other acts similar to that of Indiana: ILL. REV. STAT. c. 83, § 10a; IOVA CODE
§ 614.17 (1946); MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 330.15 (1949). Several
surveys of the different acts have been made and would provide valuable data for
property lawyers: Research Dept. Kansas Legislative Council, Record Land Titles,
Publication No. 155 (August 1948) ; Basye, Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure,
47 MicH. L. REv. 1097 (1949) ; Aigler, Clearance of Land Titles, 44 MICH. L. REV.
45 (1945); Note, 33 MINN. L. REv. 54 (1948).
21. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-634 (Burns' Supp. 1951).
22. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-635 (Burns' Supp. 1951).
23. For purposes of judicial interpretation of the statute the exceptions raise
no problem since, as to the operation of and exceptions to recording laws, the legis-
lature may use its sound discretion in the light of surrounding circumstances. Turner
v. New York, 168 U.S. 90 (1897); Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind.
373, 14 N.E. 586 (1887).
24. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1892); United States v. 7,405.3 acres of
Land, 97 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1938). The United States has voluntarily limited its
power to annul land patents to six years from issuance date, 26 STAT. 1099 (1891),
43 U.S.C. § 1166 (1946). However, there are numerous situations where the United
States need not base its rights upon an original patent. For example, the statute
does not bar the United States from protecting Indian rights. United States v.
State of Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926).
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but merely supplement, the traditional recording system. All the record-
ing act requirements of both inquiry and record notice are applicable.
Thus a purchaser has legal notice of all facts that would be disclosed by
a reasonable inquiry of such things as possession of the premises25 and
of all facts disclosed by properly recorded instruments. 28  If the data
upon re-recording has its source in a recorded instrument, the original
instrument will be incorporated by reference. For example, one who
re-records a contingent remainder which he had been devised would be
protecting 'interests under the entire will.27 Although interests acquired
by prescription or adverse possession must be (re) -recorded, their record-
ation still is not required by the recording acts. Therefore a purchaser
for value will continue to take the risks of non-discovery where the
unrecordable interests have been created within the re-recording period.
Since the traditional recording acts protect only a bona fide purchaser
for value, knowledge of any unrecorded interest of less than fifty years,
of age will prevent a purchaser from being protected by the re-recording
acts.28 But while a purchaser for value will still need to be bona fide as
to all items originating within the re-recording period prior to the
purchase,29 the re-recording acts grant their protection to purchasers
for value with no bona fide requirement. And since they become opera-
tive where an interest is not re-recorded within a certain period pridr
to a purchase, the result is that a purchaser for value will be granted
protection though he has knowledge of a non-re-recorded interest that
arose prior to the re-recording period. The purpose of the re-recording
statutes to increase alienability of land would be thwarted if any chance
knowledge of ancient claims would nullify the protection of the act.
Though the original Wisconsin act indicated only bona fide purchasers
would be protected, the position was much criticized;3O an amendment
quickly repealed this requirement, permitting interests not timely re-
recorded to be defeated absolutely upon a purchase for value.31 This
Wisconsin action emphasizes that the recording acts are operative only
within the statutory period permitted for re-recording.
While it is declared expressly that interests not re-recorded within
25. Armstrong v. Azimow, 118 Ind. App. 213, 76 N.E,2d 692 (1947).
26. Fisher v. Bush, 133 Ind. 315, 32"N.E. 924 (1892).
27. IND. ANN. STAT. §2-630(4) (Burns' Supp. 1951).
28. Walter v. Hartwig, 106 Ind. 123, 6 N.E. 5 (1885); Carmichael v. Arms,
51 Ind. App. 689, 100 N.E. 302 (1912).
29. Section nine of the act provides that a purchaser for value shall be able
to rely on a record title of not over fifty years. Within this period he operates
under the recording act and his bona fides as to the fifty year period will be inspected.
30. Tulane-Axley, Title to Real Property, 1942 Wis. L. Ray. 258.
31. Wis. STAT. §330.15(4) (1949).
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the required period will be defeated in favor of a purchaser for value,.
it may be questioned whether the acts extend their protection to other
than purchasers. For example, suppose B has the remainder interest
in Blackacre which arose in 1896 and was then recorded; in 1947 A,
the possessory life tenant, dies and by will leaves Blackacre to C who
records the will; in 1948 C makes a gift of Blackacre to D; in 1949 B
re-records his remainder interest; and in 1950 D conveys Blackacre to E
for a valuable consideration. An analysis must commence with the
realization that even under the recording acts unrecorded deeds and
other recordable interests are valid as to all persons except subsequent
purchasers, lessees or mortgagees in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration. 2  There is no substantial contrary argument as to the
re-recording acts. Alienability of land would not be materially increased
by granting protection to volunteers. It would 'be difficult to defend a
statute which, even occasionally, defeats a substantial property interest
in favor of one who receives unearned wealth. On this basis neither
C, the heir, nor D, the gratuitous donee, would be protected by the
statute. Since B's interest was re-recorded before E made a purchase
for value, the remainder interest of B should be protected. The fact
that B's interest was re-recorded later than fifty years from its origin
should not be material since the statute is not one of limitation. One
state, Wisconsin, thought it necessary to provide expressly that interests
can be re-recorded at any time, with the power to record being terminated
only when a record owner in possession deals with a purchaser for
value. 3
A modification of the strict re-recordability 'requirements of the
Indiana act is provided by the sections which state that provisions and
limitations contained in the muniments of title of the record title owner
will adequately protect all included interests. 3 4 This is important in
two respects. First, it explains the failure of the legislature to enumerate
remainders as being subject to extinguishment. For except in instances
32. State Bank v. Backus, 106 Ind. 682, 67 N.E. 512 (1903) ; Larrance v. Lewis,
51 Ind. App. 1, 98 N.E. 892 (1912).
33. Wis. STAT. § 330.15(1) (1949). An analogous problem is that of the effective
period of a re-recorded claim. The Wisconsin Act is the only act that provides for
successive re-recording: ". . . and like notices or instruments may thereafter be recorded
with like effect before the expiration of each successive 30-year period." Wis. STAT.
§330.15(2) (1949). Such a construction is probably implicit in most of the acts.
It should be remembered, however, that by only permitting a single re-recording,
all interests would be required to vest in possession within one hundred years of
creation. This construction could provide a solution to the ever-annoying problem of
estates subject to forfeitures, though the limitations and conditions might be protected
by the muniment provision. Such problems are without the scope of this note.
34. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-628, 2-632 (Burns' Supp. 1951).
NOTES
of erroneous or fraudulent recording, remainders will be protected by
this provision. Since the possibility of erroneous or fraudulent record-
ing exists, however, remainders must be re-recorded the same as any
other interest. Second, the muniment provision provides a solution to
the situation where one in possession sells but there is no recorded
instrument within the prior fifty years. For example, suppose A has a
life estate in Blackacre; in 1952 B, having no interest therein, enters
upon Blackacre and takes possession; the last recorded instrument
concerning Blackacre is dated 1895. B then conveys the fee to C for
value. B of course had no legal interest in Blackacre; at most he was
a tenant per autre vie. Here clearly the muniment provision would deny
B the power to give legal title to C since the muniments of the record
title owner (A) are required to be inspected by C.35 It is a reasonable
duty to require a purchaser to inspect the last recorded deed and take
subject to the interests disclosed therein.
But though it is reasonable to compel a purchaser to inspect the
last recorded instrument, it would be quite'another matter to compel
him to take the risk of the authenticity of what is recorded. Suppose
B, possessing land adversely or having a limited interest therein, records
a fictitious deed with himself as grantee of the fee. Unlike the situation
under the traditional recording system, the fraudulent document could
be perfectly consistent with all recorded documents under the protection
of the re-recording acts. The inquiry thus posed is whether B would
then be a fifty year record titleholder in possession with power to convey
good title to a purchaser for value. If it were decided that a pur-
chaser for value must bear the risks of recorded fictitious conveyances,
alienability would be substantially decreased. Although the recording
acts place the risks of fictitious deeds on a purchaser, failure to re-record
introduces another fault element which proves decisive in shifting the
risks from the purchaser to the party at fault.36
While in general there is little ground for objection to the re-
recording acts, two provisions of the Indiana statute, possible sources
35. It is of course a reasonable duty to require a purchaser of realty, to inspect
at least the last recorded deed. Cf. MIcH. Comp. LAws § 565.102 (1948) which requires
a continuing search back through the records if the instrument under which an owner
claims is less than forty years of age. The search will not be terminated until a
deed from an ancestor of the owner is found; intermediate inconsistent interests
are fully protected since their recordation would prevent the purported owner from
having an "unbroken chain of title."
36. Michigan has attempted to reduce the incidence of fraudulent re-recording
by providing criminal penalties therefor. MicH. Comp. LAws § 565.108 (1948). It should
also be remembered that civil remedies, such as constructive trusteeships of money
received, or tort actions for interference with contractual relations, would very often
be available against the fraudulently recording party.
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of criticism, should be carefully construed. (1) The possible destruction
of contingent remainders before the remainderman is ascertainable;
(2) The duty of a claimant to bring an action within a year of re-
recording or be forever barred from asserting his claim.
The act grants no special protection to unascertainable contingent
remaindermen. However, this should raise no serious objection; for
an extension of re-recording time would not only decrease alienability
of land, but would also afford more protection than has traditionally
been granted these interests.37  Legislatures have recognized that it is
often desirable that unascertainable contingent remainders be subject to
statutory destruction.38 And while there are but few cases interpreting
such statutes, the few have been well reasoned. Though unascertainable
contingent remainders have been held to be "property," 39 they can be
statutorily destroyed4" if someone is appointed by the court to plead the
cause of the unascertainable remainderman. 4' In no cases have re-
mainders with a substantial chance of vesting in interest been destroyed.
42
Under these decisions the relevant inquiry would be whether the provision
in the Indiana act that claims of unascertained remaindermen could be
filed by "any person" would be a sufficient protection of those interests.
Taken in context of the statute, the provision is very reasonable and
entirely adequate. When one considers how very few remainders of
any type will be subject to destruction and how seldom will there be
remainders which 'fail to vest in interest within fifty years of creation,
it is obvious that cases where unascertainable interests are destroyed
will be extremely few. 43 The same interest in alienability which nurtured
the Rule Against Perpetuities would in effect establish a rephrasal of
the Rule: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
37. Though the terminology "unascertainable remaindermen" is used in the dis-
cussion, it should be noted that this also comprehends the problems of those who will
take under executory limitations; they would not be available to re-record their
interests before their claim vests in interest and possession.
38. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 240, §§ 6, 8 (1933); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 703.12 (1948).
39. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 214 Fed. 928 (7th Cir. 1914); Cress v. Ham-
mett, 144 Kan. 128, 58 P.2d 61 (1936).
40. Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 49 N.E. 652 (1898) ; Mathews v. Lightner,
85 Minn. 333, 88 N.W. 992 (1902).
41. Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N.E. 667 (1918).
42. The only case found where it was held a contingent remainder could be
destroyed without the court providing adequate representation for the interest of the
unascertainable remainderman was reversed on appeal. McArthur v. Scott, 3 Fed. 313
(D.C. Cir. 1880), rev'd, 113 U.S. 340 (1885).
43. Thus it could well be that the protection given by the "any person" provision
would be held unnecessary in those states which have not provided for re-recording
by a third party.
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interest," 44. provided, however, that such interest will become void if
not a matter of record within the fifty years prior to a purchase for
value.
A more substantial and vexing problem is raised by the provision
that a claimant must bring an action within a year after re-recording
or his claim shall be completely barred and all rights under such notice
shall terminate.4 5 Only one of the other acts, Minnesota's, contained a
similar provision; and that was promptly eliminated by amendment. 40
This provision, which either creates or accelerates controversies, is
subject to four interpretations: (1) The claimant must bring an action
of ejectment; (2) The claimant must bring an action of ejectment if
he has a possessory interest; (3) The claimant must bring a quiet title
action; (4) The claimant must bring a quiet title action if he had
filed an interest unrecordable under the recording acts.
If an action of ejectment were required of all claimants, the result
would be a legislative declaration that all land interests must vest in
possession within fifty-one years of creation, subject to possible exten-
sion until there is a purchase for value. This considerable alteration
of the 1945 Indiana Statute Against Perpetuities, while an extremely
interesting theory, seems far in excess of the purpose of the re-recording
acts. The acts are concerned with alienability of land, permitting a
landowner to easily sell what he owns, rather than to change the rule
as to what land interests may be created.
Another possible construction is that an action of ejectment must
be commenced within one year if the claimant has a possessory interest
at the time he re-records. This would have the effect of shortening the
Statute of Limitations for ejectment in many cases.
The provision could be interpreted to require that a quiet, title
action be brought by all claimants upon re-recording. From the stand-
point of fairness, such a requirement appears untenable. For the result
would be a requirement that an action be brought to protect the interest
of one already in the enjoyment of all he claims. How any useful pur-
pose would be served is difficult to perceive. Moreover, for the same
reason, such a provision could well be in conflict with the Natural Rights
44. GRuAY, RULE AGAINST PiEnTITIES 191 (4th. ed. 1942).
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-631 (Burns' Supp. 1951). One mechanical problem imme-
diately arises where the one re-recording takes by an instrument which also conveyed
interests to other persons. Though these other interests have been re-recorded by
reference, see supra, n.27 and text, the problem arises' as to whether an "action"
brought by the one re-recording satisfies the bring-an-action clause as to the other
interests included in the original document.
46. Minn. Laws 1947, c. 118.
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Clause of the Indiana Constitution 47 or the Fourteenth Amendment.48
Recent Kansas49 and Pennsylvania 50 cases have held unconstitutional
similar statutory requirements. Since the social interest in alienability
is adequately served by re-recording, the requirement of an action could
thus prove an unwarranted interference with property.
The final interpretation of the bring-an-action requirement would
be the most desirable. That is, whenever an interest unrecordable under
the recording acts is filed, a quiet title action must be commenced by
the claimant. In most instances, claims affected would be those acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. Such interests are of course
subject. to (re)-recording within fifty years after acquisition; and a
subsequent quiet title action would determine the bona fides of the
claimant's interest. In such situations there should be no objection on
grounds of fairness, for interests acquired adversely may remain uncer-
tain in any event, until it is judicially recognized that the requisites
for ownership have been met.51 Of course, the outstanding weakness
47. IND. CONST. Art. I, § 1. It has been stated that: "The guarantee of natural
rights, curtailed only to the extent to which the promotion of the public peace,
safety, health or welfare requires has become the basic doctrine of Indiana constitutional
law for the twentieth century." Paulsen, Natural Rights-A Constitutional Doctrine in
Indiana, 25 IND. L.J. 123, 143 (1950) (italics supplied).
48. -See Department of Insurance v. Schoonover, 225 Ind. 187, 72 N.E.2d 747
(1947). Long ago Judge Cooley stated that one in the enjoyment of all he claims
cannot be required to bring an action to protect his interests. 2 COOLEY, CON'STITUnONAL
LIMITATIONs 763 (8th ed. 1927).
49. Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949). A statute
provided that where a plat of an original town or addition thereto has been of record
for over twenty-five years, deeds given by the person platting the same shall be con-
clusively presumed to have conveyed perfect title. The court said in part: ". . . since
the involved statute has the effect of divesting the holder of a record fee simple
title to land of his title and transferring it to another without regard to the possession
and occupancy of the owner . . - unless his title is asserted in an action brought within
one year from the date such statute took effect, we are constrained to hold it violates
the due process clause of the federal constitution."
50. Girard Trust Company v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 364 Pa. 576, 73
A.2d 371, 71 Pa. D. & C. 533 (1950). A statute provided that fifty years after ground
rents or mortgages had been payable by a single payment, the same would be con-
clusively presumed to have been paid and discharged unless an action or pro-
ceeding shall have been instituted for the payment or collection of such charge. The
lease under the ground rents had contained a clause by which the lessees could forever
redeem all future rents by a fixed payment. The fixed sum was not paid and fifty
years thereafter an action was commenced by the lessees to quiet title under provisions
of the statute. The joined action was based upon an open end mortgage fifty years
after its creation. In holding the statute unconstitutional the court said: "One of the
most irreconcilable parts of this act . .. is that it requires parties to institute an
action where no controversy exists. Suits must be instituted .. .where no defaults
have occurred, where no cause of action has arisen, and where all parties are in
agreement concerning the charge or obligation .. "
51. That title acquisition by adverse possession is predominantly based upon legis-
lative toleration is indicated by a trend to the policy of requiring an adverse claimant
to pay the taxes. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §3-1314 (Burns' Repl. 1946).
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of this interpretation is that the claim need not be filed for at least fifty
years subsequent to acquisition. .For this reason, the provision perhaps
would be of little effect.
None of these interpretations is satisfactory. The language of the
provision clearly, is inadequate to indicate a choice. And at least one
construction would raise constitutional questions. The only solution is
immediate clarification by the legislature in order to aid judicial con-
struction.
The re-recording acts provide a desirable solution to the chronic
problem of land alienability. As a supplement to the recording system, the
statutes require that interests in land to be protected against extinguish-
ment by a purchaser for value, must be a matter of record within a certain
period prior to the purchase. Such legislation is, naturally, a valid exercise
of the police power; the states' authority to regulate the holding of
property by requiring timely recording has long been recognized.52 The
fairness and efficacy of the acts are remarkable: simple re-recording
gives almost maximum protection to security of title, but immaterial
and irrelevant data will no longer constitute a deterrent to land
alienability.5 3
ESCHEAT OF CORPORATE STOCKS AND DIVIDENDS
In their constant quest for revenue, many states have enacted legis-
lation incorporating common law principles of escheat.' In all juris-
dictions, real and personal property is appropriated in event of its
52. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1910), where Mr. Chief Justice
White said: "As it is indisputable that the general welfare of society is involved
in the security of titles to real estate and in the public registry of such titles, it is
obvious that the power to legislate as to such subjects is in the very nature of gov-
ernment."
53. So far there have been very few re-recordings under the statutes. Record
Land Titles, supra, note 20. Whatever the reasons, attorneys who fail to inform
their clients of the acts are shirking their professional responsibility. While some
interests -may have already been -defeated, timely re-recording will still generally be
effective. Until the acts become well known, the courts may wish to construe them
liberally, so that present non-re-recorded interests may be given a grace period. One
method of accomplishing this result would be to require that a purchaser have relied
upon the act in his abstract examination. Reliance by title examiners and re-recorda-
tion by land claimants are equally dependent upon knowledge of the new systqm of
title recordation.
1. In medieval land law, escheat was a tenurial right of the feudal, lord, which,
after the Statute of Quia Emptores, became a right of the king. 7 HoLDsworH, AN
HIsToRIcAL INTRODUCTION To LAND LAW 33 (2d ed. 1936). When an owner abandoned
personal property, or died intestate without heirs, the property was appropriated by
the Crown under the doctrine of Bona Vacantia; the rationale being that the claim
